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COMMENTS
BIG BROTHER'S WAR ON TELEVISION ADVERTISING:
HOW EXTENSIVE IS THE REGULATORY
AUTHORITY OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION?
by Cindy Morgan Ohlenforst
Although originally designed to protect fair competition, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has gradually become a formidable consumer
protection agency;' it has long had the authority to proscribe unfair or
deceptive trade practices,2 and in recent years has often used that authority
to regulate national advertising.' Recent FTC orders have mandated
changes in the advertising for Listerine,4 Wonder Bread,5 and Beneficial.6
In each of these cases the FTC challenged a specific advertising approach
on the grounds that it was unfair or deceptive. The FTC need not, how-
ever, limit its authority to a specific advertising campaign;7 indeed, the
I. Kinter & Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a Formidable
Consumer Protection Agency, 26 MERCER L. REV. 651 (1975). This discussion summarizes
the expansion and development of FTC power.
2. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(i) (1976) [hereinafter cited as
FTCA]; see notes 30-33 infra and accompanying text.
3. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader. Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Adpertising, 90
HARv. L. REV. 661, 675 (1977). This FTC regulation has sometimes taken the form of broad
orders affecting several manufacturers. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S.
374 (1965), in which the court upheld an FTC order stating that it is a deceptive practice to
convey falsely to television viewers that they are seeing an actual test when, in fact, undis-
closed mockups are being used. Other FTC action has consisted of narrow, particularized
orders affecting only a single advertising campaign. See, e.g., National Comm'n on Egg
Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 86, 58 L. Ed. 2d 113
(1978), in which the court upheld an FTC order directing petitioners to cease and desist
advertising that there is no scientific evidence that egg consumption increases the risk of
heart and circulatory disease.
4. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The court upheld an
FTC order requiring Listerine advertisements to disclose that Listerine does not cure colds.
See note 108 infra.
5. ITT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976); see note 108 infra.
6. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983
(1977).
7. FTCA § 18(a)(l)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(l)(B) (1976); see text accompanying note 36
ifra.
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FTC is currently proposing broad rules that would severely restrict adver-
tising on children's television programs.' Although the FTC's goal of pro-
tecting children is laudable, its proposed rules may exceed its statutory
authority9 and face constitutional challenges as well."0
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PROPOSED RULES
One of the most active proponents of the proposed advertising restric-
tions is Action for Children's Television (ACT), a nonprofit consumer or-
ganization formed to encourage better television programming for
children." ACT originally suggested that each station be required to pro-
vide children's programming as part of its public service requirement and
that children's programs have no commercials.' 2 ACT presented these
proposals to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1970.
The FCC subsequently issued a public notice calling for comment on these
restrictions,' 3 and ultimately received more than 100,000 comments on the
proposals.' 4 During the time of these proceedings the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters (NAB), faced with the prospect of mandatory outside
regulation, voluntarily strengthened its self-regulatory code."' The
changes included reducing from sixteen to twelve minutes per hour the
time that could be devoted to nonprogram material during children's pro-
gramming, and requiring that no advertisement encourage children to eat
immoderate amounts of sweets.1 6 Because of this industry progress toward
self-regulation, the FCC finally decided, in 1974, that government
rulemaking was unnecessary at that time.' 7 After its unsuccessful chal-
lenge of the FCC's refusal to adopt specific rules,' 8 ACT petitioned the
FTC.
8. 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 461).
9. FTCA § 18(e)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(3) (1976) incorporates the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act into the Federal Trade Commission Act. According to the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1976), an agency rule may be set aside if it exceeds statutory
authority or limitations.
10. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (1976) states that an agency rule may be set aside if it is con-
trary to constitutional right or authority.
11. ACT is an organization of Massachusetts parents formed in 1968 whose activities
expanded to encompass national problems pertaining to children's television. See generally
Thain, Suffer the Hucksters to Come Unto the Little Children? Possible Restrictions of Televi-
sion Advertising to Children Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 56 B.U.L.
REV. 651 (1976).
12. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
13. Action for Children's Television (ACT) for Rulemaking Looking Toward the Elim-
ination of Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Programming and the Estab-
lishment of a Weekly 14 Hour Quota of Children's Television Programs, 28 F.C.C.2d 368
(1971).
14. 564 F.2d at 463.
15. The possibility of congressional action may have helped prompt the self-regulation.
Id. at 463 n.9.
16. Id. at 464. But see Note, The Limits of Broadcast Self-Regulation Under the First
Amendment, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1527, 1544-48 (1975). See also Thain, supra note 1.1, at 654.
17. 564 F.2d at 464. For a discussion of the relationship between agency pressure and
industry self-regulation, see Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064
(C.D. Cal. 1976).
18. 564 F.2d at 479.
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.In April 1977 the FTC received ACT's request for the promulgation of a
trade regulation rule19 proscribing the advertising of candy products on
television before 9:05 p.m., or on programs where children make up at
least half the audience, or where the dominant appeal of the advertising is
to children.2" The FTC decided to commence its current rulemaking proc-
ess based on this petition from ACT and also on a petition filed the same
month by the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI).21 CSPI
requested a complete prohibition on advertising of sugared snack foods, as
well as disclosure within advertisements of the amount of added sugar in
other products and the dental health risks of sugar consumption.22
In response to these petitions, the FTC promulgated a Staff Report on
Televised Advertising to Children. This report proposes several possible
limitations on television advertising.23 The FTC issued a Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking24 in April 1978, stating that the rulemaking proceed-
ings would consider these restrictions on television advertisements directed
to children. 25 Accordingly, the FTC presently seeks comments on a rule
that would include the following provisions:
(a) Ban all televised advertising for any product which is directed to,
or seen by, audiences composed of a significant proportion of children
who are too young to understand the selling purpose of or otherwise
comprehend or evaluate the advertising;
(b) Ban televised advertising for sugared food products directed to,
or seen by, audiences composed of a significant proportion of older
children, the consumption of which products poses the most serious
dental health risks;
(c) Require televised advertising for sugared food products not in-
cluded in Paragraph (b), which is directed to, or seen by, audiences
composed of a significant proportion of older children, to be balanced
by nutritional and/or health disclosures funded by advertisers.26
The Commission also seeks comments on alternative proposals, including
requirements for affirmative disclosure.27
19. A trade regulation rule is essentially a form of administrative legislation. See gener-
ally Hobbs, Legal Issues in FTC Trade Regulation Rules, 1977 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J.
414.
20. 43 Fed. Reg. 17,968 (1978).
21. Id. at 17,968 n.2. The FTC received a third petition for rulemaking filed jointly by
Consumers Union of America and Committee on Children's Television Inc. This petition,
which was filed on Feb. 16, 1978, also requests specific rules on children's advertising. Id.
22. Id. at 17,968.
23. Id. at 17,969. Copies of this report may be obtained by writing Distribution and
Duplication Branch, Federal Trade Commission Building, Room 128, 6th Street and Penn-
sylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C. 20580.
24. The FTC is required to "publish a notice of proposed rulemaking stating with par-
ticularity the reason for the proposed rule." FTCA § 18(b)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(l) (1976).
25. 43 Fed. Reg. at 17,967, 17,968. The FTC staff report defines "young children" as
those under age eight, and defines "older children" as those between ages eight and twelve.
The FtC seeks comments on the appropriateness of these classifications. Id. at 17,969.
26. Id.
27. The FTC may order an advertiser to affirmatively disclose certain information in its
advertisements. For a list of such orders, see Reich, Consumer Protection and the First
Amendment: A Dilemma/or the FTC', 61 M, N. L. REv. 705, 711 n.31 (1977).
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Although the rulemaking procedure is only in its initial stages, 28 and
there are still numerous issues of fact and law that must be decided before
the Commission can formulate a precise rule, threshold questions concern-
ing the FTC's statutory authority and constitutional limitations29 need to
be considered.
II. THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR THE PROPOSED RULES
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act declares "unfair or de-
ceptive acts in or affecting commerce" illegal, and empowers the FTC to
issue cease and desist orders.30 Most FTC regulation of national advertis-
ing has been pursuant to its section 5 authority,31 although the FTC may
also rely on section 12, which specifically provides that the dissemination
of false advertisements is an unfair or deceptive trade practice and there-
fore unlawful.32 Section 5 allows the FTC to challenge a practice either on
the ground that it is deceptive or on the ground that it is unfair. The FTC
historically has relied primarily on its authority to regulate deceptive ad-
vertising, but in recent years it has also begun to rely on its authority to
challenge unfair advertising.33
FTC action often results in specific orders directed to a particular adver-
tiser, such as cease and desist orders34 or orders for corrective advertis-
ing,35 but the FTC's authority is not limited to such orders. The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act of 1975 authorizes the FTC to prescribe "rules which define with spec-
ificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive.",36 Thus, the FTC
may rule in advance that certain practices constitute deceptive or unfair
trade practices. This rulemaking authority enables the FTC to proscribe a
pattern of conduct, and one critic argues that through its rulemaking the
FTC is "parlaying its essentially negative definitional authority to define
and proscribe unfair and deceptive practices into an affirmative power to
prescribe a particularized, mandatory, and often far-reaching code of fair
28. The first legislative hearing was scheduled for Nov. 6, 1978, in San Francisco. The
hearing was scheduled to continue on Nov. 20, 1978, in Washington, D.C. 43 Fed. Reg. at
17,967. The hearings were rescheduled, however, for Jan. 15 and Feb. 15, 1979. Then, in
December, Kellogg Co. requested a further delay, suggesting a May 1, 1979, starting date.
ADA News, Dec. 25, 1978, at 3, col. 1. Hearings finally began in Mar. 1979.
29. The FTC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking recognized the existence of possible first
amendment limitations on FTC regulation of advertising, and the FTC seeks information
on this issue. 43 Fed. Reg. at 17,970.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
31. See Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 669.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).
33. See Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 675-87.
34. See, e.g., ITT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976); text
accompanying note 108 infra.
35. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), discussed at
note 4 supra.
36. FTCA § 18(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (1976). This legislation actually con-
firmed the FTC's rulemaking authority; the FTC had used substantive rulemaking to en-
force FTCA § 5 since 1962. Kinter & Smith, supra note 1, at 673-74.
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conduct for an entire industry."37 Even if this claim is true, the FTC's
statutory authority is limited to deceptive and unfair trade practices. The
currently proposed rules concerning advertising on children's television
therefore lie within the FTC's authority only if the FTC finds that the
advertisements are deceptive or unfair.
A. Deceptive Advertising
Courts have traditionally allowed the FTC broad discretion in defining
"deceptive" and in making a fact finding that a particular advertisement is
deceptive.38 For the purposes of FTC action, an act is deceptive if it has
the capacity or tendency to deceive an average or ordinary person, even
though that person may have been ignorant, unthinking, or credulous.39
This definition allows the FTC to regulate advertising without bearing the
burden of proving that consumers were actually deceived, or that the ad-
vertisements were patently false, since courts have stressed that the Com-
mission need show only capacity to deceive rather than actual deception.4"
In Beneficial Corp. v. FTC,4 1 for example, the FTC determined that a
finance company's advertisements for "Instant Tax Refunds" were decep-
tive because they did not indicate that potential clients were required to
meet the company's standard credit tests before receiving their "instant
refunds." There was no affirmative untruthful statement, merely the crea-
tion of a misleading impression. In sustaining the FTC's finding that the
advertisement was nevertheless deceptive, the court noted that advertising
may be "misleading even absent evidence of. . . actual effect on custom-
ers."42 The court also stated that whether a particular advertisement has a
tendency to mislead is a finding of fact rather than a conclusion of law.4 3
One reason the courts allow the FTC extensive discretion is the gener-
ally accepted policy that "courts should defer to the informed experience
and judgment of the agency to whom Congress delegated appropriate au-
thority."" This policy also mandates that an FTC fact finding that adver-
tisements are deceptive be upheld by a reviewing court "unless arbitrary or
37. Hobbs, supra note 19, at 421.
38. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 389 U.S. 374 (1965). See also Giant Food Inc.
v. FTC, 322 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 29 (7th Cir.
1944) (holding that the FTC may "decide for itself' whether advertisements are deceptive).
39. Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942). See also FTC v. Standard
Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
40. Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944). The
extent of the FTC's discretion is indicated in Gelb v. FTC, 144 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1944), in
which the court approved the FTC finding that hair dye advertisements for "permanent"
dye were deceptive insofar as someone might not realize that the dye would last only until
the hair grew out. See generaly Gellhom, Proof of Consumer Deception Before the Federal
Trade Commission, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 559, 563-67 (1969).
41. 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
42. Id. at 617.
43. Id See also FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
44. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 372 (1973). The situa-
tion in that case may be distinguished from the FTC's current rulemaking procedure on the
ground that the agency in Mourning was dealing more with administrative decisions than
with first amendment rights. But see note 88 infra.
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clearly wrong."45 The FTC has expanded this interpretation of its author-
ity by determining that an advertisement that might not deceive an aver-
age consumer could still deceive a particularly vulnerable group, such as
children.4 6
The FTC's proposed rules deal with both advertisements for certain
products and advertisements on children's television programs.47 In order
to base these broad rules on its authority to regulate deceptive advertising,
the FTC must prove that advertisments of these products, or children's
advertising in general, is inherently deceptive. This approach is weak for
several reasons. First, it is arguable that a ban on the advertising of sug-
ared foods is, on its face, aimed not at deception but at certain products
and is, therefore, outside the statutory authority of the FTC.48 Secondly, a
ban on all advertising directed to or seen by children would presumably
include even a simple statement that a program was sponsored by a given
manufacturer. An advertiser's claim that "this program was sponsored by
the Brand X Food Corporation" could not be characterized as deceptive,
even under the broad definition of deceptive used by the FTC.49 Thirdly,
unless the FTC can prove that all advertisements directed at children are
per se deceptive, those advertisers who do present accurate, truthful adver-
tising should be able to rebut FTC charges of deception. In essence, the
proposed FTC rules deny advertisers the right to air nondeceptive adver-
tisements. Finally, the FTC would face practical problems in delineating
the allegedly deceptive advertising. What percentage sugar content in a
product renders the advertising for that product deceptive? What age au-
dience renders such advertising deceptive? What percentage of adults in
the audience rescues the advertising from being labeled deceptive?
50
The above difficulties mean that the FTC, notwithstanding its broad dis-
cretionary power in defining deceptive advertising,5 faces a formidable
45. Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1957).
See also FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
46. See Stupell Originals, Inc., 67 F.T.C. 173 (1965); Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 675-76.
See also Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8326
(1964) (cigarette advertising).
47. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
48. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
49. The FTC's proposed rules apply to "televised advertising," a phrase not specifically
defined. See text accompanying note 26 supra. Unless the FTC interprets "televised adver-
tising" as excluding announcements of sponsorship and statements of fact that include only
the name and price of the product advertised, judicial approval of an FTC conclusion that
all televised advertising is deceptive seems unlikely.
50. The FTC would face difficulty in justifying a finding that the deceptive nature of
advertising is dependent upon the fact that a certain, set percentage of the audience is within
a certain, set age bracket. In reviewing a remedy chosen by the Commission, the court must
ask if the remedy has a "reasonable relation" to the unlawful practices found to exist. See
FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419,429 (1957). Thus, the Commission must show that
its age brackets and percentages of child viewers are reasonably related to whatever adver-
tising practices it proves to be deceptive or unfair. See also note 25 supra. Moreover, re-
strictions must be narrowly tailored to eliminate the deception. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542
F. 2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977). See also text accompanying notes
92-96 infra.
51. One critic has argued that there are virtually no limits on the power of the FTC.
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task in finding that all advertising either on children's programs or of sug-
ared products is inherently deceptive. Without such a finding, a ban
would exceed the FTC's statutory authority,52 at least when the advertising
is found not to be unfair.
B. Unfair Advertising
Rather than face the problems of proof and challenges to its statutory
authority that would accompany a finding that all advertising of certain
products is per se deceptive when directed to children, the FTC could
choose to rely on its authority to regulate unfair advertising.53 Although
the FTC's authority to deal with unfair trade practices was granted at the
same time as its authority to deal with deceptive trade practices,54 the defi-
nition of "unfair" is still unclear as it is only within the past fifteen years
that the FTC has begun to rely on this power.55
The FTC has delineated three criteria by which it judges advertising to
be unfair:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established
by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in other words,
it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or
other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, un-
ethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial
injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen). 6
According to FTC analysis, advertising in these categories may be unfair
even if it is not actually deceptive. This interpretation allows the FTC
For an interesting justification and rationalization of the FTC's power, see Reich, supra note
27. Reich, the Director of the Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation of the Federal Trade
Commission, argues that "the FTC has acquired defacto expertise in protecting the flow of
truthful commercial speech by virtue of its statutory responsibility to protect consumers, and
accordingly there is no need for a reviewing court's neutrality or constitutional expertise."
Id. at 739.
52. See note 9 supra; cf. Thain, supra note 11, at 662 (suggests that prohibitions on
certain types of advertising are more properly within the authority of the FCC than the
FTC).
53. One proponent of the FTC rule concedes that "[b]ecause there is no inherent limit
on the reach of implied deception, it could encompass virtually any advertising." Moreover,
a rule based on the implicit representations in children's television advertising might be
unacceptable since it would set a "potential precedent for attacking numerous other adver-
tisements." The proponent therefore concludes that it would be easier and more prudent for
the FTC to base its rule on the "unfairness" theory: "The unfairness approach allows the
FTC gradually to extend the scope of 'unfair conduct' as society's standards evolve, while
avoiding many problems associated with scientific measurements of audience reaction to,
and perception of, advertisements." Thain, supra note 11, at 657-58.
54. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
55. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 223 (1973); ITT Continental Baking
Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976). But see FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920), in
which the Court adopted a narrow definition of "unfair." The FTC's present broad ap-
proach was foreshadowed in FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304 (1934) (holding that a
practice not previously declared unlawful could be found unfair). The Keppel case is espe-
cially relevant as it deals with a sales approach designed to increase children's candy
purchases.
56. Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355
(1964) (ban of cigarette advertising).
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enormous discretion in determining which advertising may be regulated,57
especially since its jurisdiction may be based on policy decisions.
The FTC's authority to develop standards of fairness was strengthened
by the Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson.58 In that
case the Supreme Court considered for the first time whether a practice
might be unfair absent any deception of consumers or unfairness to com-
petitors. The Court's opinion upheld the FTC's determination that adver-
tising may be unfair in such a situation, and stated that the FTC, like a
court of equity, may consider public values when it uses its section 5 au-
thority,59 thus confirming the FTC's interpretation of its statutory author-
ity to deal with unfair advertising. Unfortunately, the Court did not
expressly approve the FTC criteria for determining if advertising is unfair,
and further litigation will be necessary to clarify the applicable stan-
dards.6" As the then-Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the
FTC stated: "The Supreme Court's broad grant of authority to the FTC to
develop new rules in the consumer protection field is too vague to provide
any meaningful enforcement guidelines."'" Other authorities agree that
further definition of the terms "unfair" and "immoral" is necessary, 62 es-
pecially since the FTC was dealing with a specific adjudicatory decision in
Sperry & Hutchinson63 rather than with a general rulemaking procedure.
Despite the confusion in this area, the FTC's discretion in determining
what advertisements are unfair is probably broad enough to allow a find-
ing that children's advertising, or the advertising of a particular product, is,
as a class, unfair. The FTC has already decided that advertisements aimed
at a particularly susceptible group,64 or those that "address themselves to
particularly vulnerable aspects of their audiences . . . might conceivably
render even truthful messages unfair."65 Based on the above judicially ap-
57. This discretion is of course subject to judicial review. Although the FTCA does not
incorporate the "substantial evidence" standard of review enunciated in the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976), it provides that the court may grant appropriate
relief if the court finds that the Commission's action is not supported by substantial evidence
in the rulemaking record. FTCA § 18(e)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(3)(A) (1976).
58. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
59. Id. at 244.
60. In Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972), decided shortly after Sperry & Hutchinson, the
FTC held that it is an unfair practice for an advertiser to make claims unsupported by
adequate prior substantiation. (Pfizer had advertised that its "Unburn" sunburn remedy
would anesthetize nerve endings in the skin, but had no substantiation for its claim.) The
FTC has also held that a failure to disclose information may constitute unfairness. See
Control Data Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,980 (1972)
(determining that failure to give adequate information about the success of its graduates in
obtaining jobs was unfair).
61. Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 681.
62. See Nelson, The Politicization of FTC Rulemaking, 8 CONN. L. REV. 413 (1976);
Schwartz, Regulating Unfair Practices Under the FTC Act. The Need/or a Legal Standard of
Unfairness, 11 AKRON L. REV. 1 (1977).
63. The Court's review was of an FTC cease and desist order directed toward Sperry &
Hutchinson's practice of unfairly attempting to suppress trading stamp exchanges.
64. See Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972).
65. ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865, 963 (1973), modfifed and enforced, 532
F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976); see Thain, supra note 11, at 657-62. Thain specifically discusses the
precedents for FTC determinations that advertising directed toward children may be unfair.
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proved conclusions, the FTC's proposed rules may be justified as within
the FTC's statutory authority. If the FTC relies on an "unfairness" finding
to regulate the advertising, however, it may face serious objections based
on violation of constitutional rights.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED RULES
Until recently the Supreme Court held that first amendment protection
for free speech does not apply to commercial speech.66 In Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,67 however, the Court
first indicated that commercial speech was not to be automatically denied
all first amendment protection.68 Rather, the Court indicated that a bal-
ancing test, weighing the government interest in regulation against "[any
First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordi-
nary commercial proposal," would be appropriate.69 In 1975 the Court
announced in Bigelow v. Virginia70 that a state could not prohibit advertis-
ing of legal abortions without abridging first amendment protected speech.
In that case the Court stressed the necessity for a balancing test: "Regard-
less of the particular label asserted. . . whether. . . 'commercial' or 'com-
mercial advertising' or 'solicitation'-a court may not escape the task of
assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the
public interest allegedly served by the regulation."'"
Although commercial speech does not merit the same degree of protec-
tion as noncommercial speech, in both Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council 2 and Bates v. State Bar 3 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the importance of first amendment protection for com-
mercial speech, 7 holding that the free flow of truthful commercial infor-
mation cannot constitutionally be banned. In light of these decisions75 at
least one court already has commented that the FTC's broad interpretation
of its section 5 remedial power cannot survive the demise of the commer-
66. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942), in which the Court held that
the first amendment did not protect "purely commercial advertising." See also Breard v.
City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). In
Breard and Murdock the Court indicated the significant reach of Valentine, and further
clarified the standard used in that case.
67. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
68. Pittsburgh Press was the first decision applicable to commercial speech in general.
It was preceded by the landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), in which the Court recognized a conditional first amendment defense available to
newspapers against defamation actions by public officials.
69. 413 U.S. at 389.
70. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
71. Id. at 826.
72. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
73. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
74. See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), in which the Court
held unconstitutional a prohibition on the advertising and display of contraceptives.
75. For an overview of the new first amendment, commercial speech cases, see Com-
ment, First Amendment Protectionfor CommercialAdvertising. The New Constitutional Doc-
trine, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 205 (1976). The author also sets forth possible standards for
distinguishing commercial speech from noncommercial speech for first amendment pur-
poses.
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cial speech exception to the first amendment.76
A. The Conflict between the FTC and the First Amendment
Deceptive Advertising. The broad power and discretion of the FTC devel-
oped during a period in which commercial speech was not considered to be
protected by the first amendment. 77 Accordingly, the first amendment was
not considered a limitation on the FTC's power to deal with commercial
advertising. The opinion of the Supreme Court in Jacob Siegel Co. v.
FTC7 8 is representative of the deference accorded the FTC during that
time; the Court held that judicial review of FTC remedies is limited be-
cause the "Commission has wide discretion in its choice of a remedy."79
The emergence of first amendment protection for commercial speech,
however, raises significant problems with continuing the policy of allowing
the FTC to "decide for itself' 8° what constitutes deception. 81 The Court
stressed in Bates that, "[a]dvertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading
of course is subject to restraint, ' 82 a point it had already emphasized in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy.83 According to the FTC, this approach
to deceptive advertising means that a case-by-case balancing of govern-
mental interest versus the constitutional right at stake, as required in Bige-
low, 4 is unnecessary where the commercial speech is deceptive. 85
Consequently, according to the FTC's reasoning, once an FTC finding is
made that advertising is deceptive, that advertising is no longer protected
by the first amendment. One proponent of the FTC position has even ar-
gued that a court errs if it assumes that the first amendment requires a
court to substitute its own judgment for that of the FTC; rather, the Com-
mission's determinations should be dispositive of the first amendment is-
sue.
8 6
If this view of the FTC authority is accepted, it would mean that the
FTC, and not the courts, would make the ultimate decision as to the extent
of first amendment protection. Although the courts have frequently given
federal agencies broad discretion,87 those whose speech is regulated must
76. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 983
(1977); see text accompanying note 41 supra.
77. See Reich, supra note 27.
78. 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
79. Id. at 611.
80. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
81. See generaly Note, Yes, FTC, There is a Virginia.- The Impact of Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. on the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's Regulation of Misleading Advertising, 57 B.U.L. REV. 833 (1977).
82. 433 U.S. at 383.
83. 425 U.S. at 770-72.
84. See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
85. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 84, 164-66 (1976).
86. Reich, supra note 27, at 741.
87. See notes 44 & 45 supra and accompanying text. But cf Developments in the Law-
Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1039 (1967) (closer judicial scrutiny is more
appropriate for fact finding that advertising is deceptive than for other types of fact finding,
because a finding of deception is more closely related to a judicial issue of misrepresentation
than to an area of agency expertise).
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have access to judicial review employing the standard of review accorded
constitutional questions.88
Another important consideration concerns the definition of "deceptive"
used by the FTC. The "capacity to deceive" standard89 was adopted dur-
ing a period when commercial speech was not thought to be protected by
the first amendment, and, consequently, the standard was never intended
to distinguish protected speech from nonprotected speech. The definition
is, in fact, so broad that it could easily encompass truthful, accurate state-
ments of fact that are not deceptive 9° -advertisemenis that should be pro-
tected by the first amendment and subject to the balancing test enunciated
in Bigelow.9 ' Therefore, the standard may not withstand constitutional
scrutiny; even if the FTC does have the authority to determine the first
amendment issues, it may be required to use a narrower standard than its
traditional "capacity to deceive" test.
A rule or statute that forbids constitutionally protected as well as unpro-
tected activity is said to be overbroad and can be set aside as unconstitu-
tional.92 A court can declare a statute unconstitutional on its face on the
grounds that some constitutionally protected speech might be restricted by
the statute, even if the challenging party has not demonstrated that his own
constitutional rights have been infringed. The present Supreme Court has
shown a reluctance to rely on this facial overbreadth analysis, however. In
Broadrick v. Oklahoma,93 for example, the majority upheld an Oklahoma
statute that restricted the political activities of Oklahoma civil servants,
holding that,
facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules
of practice and . . . its function [is] a limited one at the outset ....
[Plarticularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we
believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep.94
Similarly, in Bates the Court specifically declined to apply the overbreadth
argument to advertising on the ground that the doctrine is unnecessary in
the context of commercial advertising because of commercial advertising's
88. The proper standard for agency review is often a confused issue. Compare note 56
supra with note 57 supra. In Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977), the court stressed the importance of the constitutional issue:
We acknowledge, of course, that we are ordinarily obliged to defer broadly to
the Commissi6n's exercise of informal discretion. . . . But we are dealing in
this case with the government regulation of a form of speech. The first
amendment requires, we believe, an examination of the Commission's action
that is more searching than in other contexts.
542 F.2d at 618-19 (citations omitted).
89. See notes 39 & 40 supra and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., notes 40 & 42 supra and accompanying text.
91. See notes 70 & 71 supra and accompanying text.
92. See note 10 supra. See generaly Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine,
83 HARv. L. REV. 844 (1970).
93. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
94. Id. at 615.
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more durable nature.95 In Bates, and in Broadrick, the Court was speak-
ing of facial overbreadth;96 neither decision means that a party whose own
constitutionally protected speech is abridged would be barred from chal-
lenging the statute as overbroad in its application. Consequently, an
overly broad rule by the FTC would be subject to constitutional attack by
advertisers whose nondeceptive advertisements were barred by the rule.
Moreover, despite its reluctance to rely on overbreadth analysis, the
Supreme Court's opinion in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville97 demon-
strates that overbreadth challenges are still valid. In Erznoznik the Court
considered an ordinance that made it a punishable offense for a drive-in
theater to exhibit a film containing nudity where the screen is visible from
a public street. Like the FTC's proposed rules, the ordinance was designed
primarily to protect minors. The Court held, however, that the restriction
was broader than permissible: "[c]learly all nudity cannot be deemed ob-
scene even as to minors."98 Arguably, all advertising cannot be deemed
deceptive even as to minors. Thus, the FTC must show that all advertising
directed toward children is inherently deceptive, not only to justify its pro-
posed rules under its statutory authority, but also to rebut charges of con-
stitutional overbreadth.
Unfair Advertising. The FTC's power to regulate unfair advertising has
been exercised without serious constitutional challenge only because its ex-
ercise preceded the Court's new first amendment interpretation of the sta-
tus of commercial speech.99 Although the Supreme Court has specifically
stated that there is no constitutional protection for untruthful speech,"°° it
has carved out no such niche for unfair speech. 10 ' To exclude unfair
speech from first amendment protection, using the FTC's extremely broad
95. 433 U.S. at 380-81; see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
96. In Bates the Court noted, "[tihe First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, however,
represents a departure from the traditional rule that a person may not challenge a statute on
the ground that it might be applied unconstitutionally in circumstances other than those
before the Court." 433 U.S. at 380.
97. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
98. Id. at 213.
99. Compare dates of cases cited at note 55 supra (using unfairness standard) with the
cases cited at notes 72-73 supra (explaining the first amendment protection for commercial
speech).
100. See notes 81-86 supra and accompanying text. But see New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-72 (1964), in which, in the context of a libel action against a
newspaper, the Court emphasized that factual error does not remove the shield of first
amendment protection from criticism of public officials' official conduct.
101. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Mr. Justice Rehnquist interpreted the Court's
decision to mean that "[u]nless the State can show that these advertisements are either actu-
ally untruthful or misleading, it presumably is not free to restrict [commercial efforts] in any
way." 425 U.S. at 782 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Even if Mr. Justice Rehnquist's interpre-
tation is correct, however, the definition of "misleading" may be broad enough to allow
restrictions. See generally Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68 (1976), in
which the Court reaffirmed the FTC's power to restrain misleading as well as false state-
ments, noting that "regulatory commissions may prohibit businessmen from making state-
ments which, though literally true, are potentially deceptive." (Footnote omitted.)
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definition of unfair,' 2 might be tantamount to excluding advertising from
protection by the first amendment, a position the Court has expressly re-
jected.1 0 3
In deciding whether to rely on its authority to regulate deceptive trade
practices as opposed to its authority to regulate unfair practices, the FTC
faces a dilemma. If it determines that the advertising is deceptive, it must
prove that all the advertisements are deceptive, or risk constitutional and
statutory challenge on the ground that the rule is overbroad. On the other
hand, if the FTC decides to base its rule on a finding that the advertise-
ments are unfair, it must prove that a ban on unfair but nondeceptive ad-
vertising does not violate the first amendment. Either approach invites
constitutional challenge.'0 4
The Choice of a Proper Remedy. The FTC has traditionally been allowed
to choose whatever remedy will, in its determination, be most appropri-
ate. 0 5 In some cases the FTC has chosen a cease and desist order directed
at a specific advertising campaign. In ITT Continental Baking Co. v.
FTC°6 for example, the court upheld an FTC order proscribing advertis-
ing promotions that implied that Wonder Bread contributed to rapid
growth by providing dramatic benefits not provided by other products. In
other cases the FTC has required affirmative disclosure'0 7 or corrective
102. See notes 56, 64 & 65 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.
104. This Comment focuses on the advertisers' right to free speech, although the Court
has also stressed the viewers' right to hear. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, for exam-
ple, the Court noted that "[i]f there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive
the advertising." 425 U.S. at 758; see Bates, 433 U.S. at 364. See also Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1978). In those cases the restrictions were a complete ban; the
concern for consumers' rights to information is less compelling in the case of the FTC's
currently proposed rules since they do not constitute a total ban. Manufacturers would still
be free to advertise in other media and on television at limited times. Moreover, children's
right to hear may be less compelling than that of adults. More stringent controls may be
permissible on communicative materials available to youths than those available to adults.
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
Ordinarily, the public's interest in the free flow of information will be perceived as being
coextensive with the speakers' interest. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
The Court has not yet been faced with a case involving the electronic media in which the
speakers' rights were in conflict with the listeners' rights, so it is difficult to predict which
rights the Court would view as paramount. The Court's suggestion that "no line between
publicly 'interesting' or 'important' commercial advertising and the opposite kind could ever
be drawn" (Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764), indicates, however, that the
Court is not likely to allow speakers' rights to be curtailed under the guise of protecting the
listener.
105. See note 109 infra and accompanying text.
106. 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976). Two advertising campaigns were at issue. One, the
"Wonder Years" campaign, included a film sequence representing a child's growth during
the years between ages one and twelve. The other, the "How Big" commercials, asked chil-
dren how big they hoped to be. Both campaigns suggested that Wonder Bread helped build
strong bodies and contribute to rapid growth.
107. E.g., National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977)
(order that advertisements that refer to the relationship between eggs and heart disease in-
clude a statement that many medical experts believe increased consumption of cholesterol,
including that in eggs, may increase the risk of heart disease), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 86, 58 L.
Ed. 2d 113 (1978); J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967) (ordering manu-
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advertising, as in Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC,"°8 in which the FTC re-
quired the manufacturers of Listerine to state that their product does not
cure colds, contrary to Listerine's previous advertising.
Before the recognition of first amendment protection for commercial
speech, the FTC was allowed almost unbridled discretion in selecting the
remedy to be used, in accord with the Supreme Court's statement that an
agency's decision as to which remedial provision is used should be upheld
as long as it is reasonably related to its objectives.' 9 With the new first
amendment interpretation concerning commercial speech, however, must
come new caution in choosing remedies, and courts have emphasized that
the FTC, "like any other governmental agency, must start from the prem-
ise that any prior restraint is suspect, and that a remedy, even for deceptive
advertising, can go no further than is necessary for the elimination of the
deception.""' Given such limitations, if the FTC elects to ban all chil-
dren's advertising, or the advertising of an entire class of products, it must
face the heavy burden of proving those bans constitutional."'
facturer of Geritol to disclose that Geritol alleviates the symptoms of tiredness only in the
small percentage of cases caused by anemia); Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952
(2d Cir.) (order that sellers of baldness treatment disclose that most baldness is caused by
factors unaffected by their product), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960).
108. 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977); cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 471
(an order requiring corrective advertising is well within the arsenal of relief provisions that
the Commission may draw upon), ajf'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1112 (1973). See, e.g., Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 975 (1972) (requiring that
25% of one year's advertising budget be spent on corrective advertising).
109. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1945). In Mourning v. Family Pub-
lications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 371-72 (1973), the Court concluded: "That some other
remedial provision might be preferable is irrelevant. We have consistently held that where
reasonable minds may differ as to which of several remedial measures should be chosen,
courts should defer to the informed experience and judgment of the agency to whom Con-
gress delegated appropriate authority." See also FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385 (1959);
FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683
(1948). Where a restriction impinges on constitutional rights, courts require existence of a
"rational" relationship between the rule and its goal. See generaly Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
110. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983
(1977). The court stressed that "[i]n failing to consider fully the feasibility of requiring
merely that advertising copy be rewritten in lieu of total excision of the offending language,
the Commission would appear to have exceeded its remedial authority .... 542 F.2d at
619. See also National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 86, 58 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1978); Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 1977); ITT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 222 (2d Cir. 1976)
(holding that a ban on "virtually any sort of televised representation of the value of food
products," irrespective of whether the representation was misleading, was too broad).
111. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976),
presents several analogous issues. In a 98-page opinion the court considered the "family
viewing" hour policy which was designed to reduce violence and adult material during
prime-time television hours. The court noted specifically, "The desirability or undesirability
of the family viewing policy is not the issue. Rather the question is who should have the
right to decide what shall and shall not be broadcast and how and on what basis should
these decisions be made." Id. at 1072. The court stated that enforcement of the family
viewing hour, by the FCC or by the National Association of Broadcasters, would be an
unconstitutional infringement of not only the first amendment rights of the producers and
writers, but also the "paramount" rights of the viewers and listeners. Id. at 1143-44. "If the
First Amendment has any meaning at all, it is that broadcasters, not FCC officials or judges,
have the authority to make programming decisions." Id. at 1154. The court did note, how-
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An advertising restriction closely analogous to the type of ban proposed
for television advertising on children's programs is the congressional ban
on televised advertising of cigarettes." 2 That ban was unsuccessfully chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds in Capital Broadcasting v. Mitchell," 3 but
the rationale used, and perhaps even the outcome, might have been differ-
ent if the case had been decided after the Supreme Court extended first
amendment protection to commercial speech. In Capital Broadcasting the
district court based its decision, later affirmed by the Supreme Court, on
the fact that product advertising was only "tangentially regarded as having
some limited indicia"' " 4 of first amendment protection, a view the
Supreme Court no longer holds." 5 Another important distinction is that
the cigarette advertising ban was the result of congressional action, not an
agency decision. Finally, at least one member of the Supreme Court has
since indicated that bans on the advertising of an entire class of products
are no longer constitutionally permissible." 6
Ironically, as one FTC investigation considers the possibility of banning
children's advertising of sugared products because of the dental risks in-
volved, another FTC investigation is "examining the possibility of a direct
challenge to the states for restrictions [on dental care] that go further than
necessary to protect the public health.""' 7 For the Commission to insist
that state legislatures tailor their regulations of commercial interests as
narrowly as possible while pursuing overly broad remedies itself in the
same area, seems patently inconsistent.
B. A Resolution of the Conflict between the FTC and the First
Amendment?
Despite the extension of first amendment protection to commercial
speech, the Supreme Court has made it clear that commercial speech does
not merit the same degree of first amendment protection as noncommer-
cial speech." II The Court stressed this point in one of its most recent deci-
sions, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association:"9 "To require a parity of
ever, that "[d]ifferent considerations might apply ... to the regulation of commercials by
the NAB." Id. at 1155 n.141 (emphasis original). See also National Ass'n of Independent
Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1975); Mt. Mansfield Televi-
sion, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding prime-time access rule for network
television broadcasting).
112. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976).
113. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affdsub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting
Att'y Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); cf. Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Ciga-
rette Labeling Act of 1965 upheld), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
114. 333 F. Supp. at 585.
115. See notes 66-76 supra and accompanying text.
116. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 790 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
117. Corby, FTC May Force Legalized Denturism on Public, DENTAL ECON., Nov. 1978,
at 47 (quoting Harrison J. Sheppard, assistant regional director of the FTC's San Franciso
office).
118. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
119. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
1979]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike
could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech." 2 ° The
FTC may, therefore, be able to promulgate broad restrictions on advertis-
ing in spite of its first amendment protection. This conclusion is further
supported by the Court's assertion that commercial speech is to be afforded
only "a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate
position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial ex-
pression." 21
Although regulation of constitutionally protected speech may be permit-
ted to serve important government interests, ' 22 the Supreme Court has em-
phasized that such regulation must be content-neutral 123 restrictions on
time, place, and manner. In Police Department v. Mosley, 124 for example,
the Court invalidated a city ordinance that prohibited picketing on a pub-
lic way within a certain distance from schools during certain times of day.
The ordinance, although purportedly a time, place, and manner restric-
tion, exempted peaceful labor picketing. The Court's opinion stressed:
The central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it describes per-
missible picketing in terms of its subject matter. Peaceful picketing on
the subject of a school's labor-management dispute is permitted, but
all other peaceful picketing is prohibited . . . . [A]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict ex-
pression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its con-
tent. 1 25
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy the Court again emphasized that
time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible only if (1) "they are
justified without reference to the content" of the speech, (2) they serve a
"significant governmental interest," and (3) they leave open "ample alter-
native channels for communication of the information."' 26 Although the
FTC could ban all advertising during children's television' 27 (a restriction
on the time of advertising), 28 it could face valid constitutional challenges
120. Id. at 456.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965).
123. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), is the only case in which the
Court permitted content-based regulation of free speech. In Lehman the Court upheld a
city's decision to refuse to accept political advertising although the city did accept other paid
advertising for display in the city-operated transit system. The case is distinguishable from
other cases dealing with government action, however, because the Court treated the city's
decision as that of a private speaker rather than a governmental one. Thus, the city was not
required to prove that its regulation was content-neutral.
124. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
125. Id. at 95-96 (emphasis added).
126. 425 U.S. at 771. See also Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
127. This is one of the FTC proposals. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
128. The advertisers could argue, however, that such television advertising is their most
effective form of advertising, and that a ban on these advertisements does not leave open
ample alternative channels for communication. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), in which the Court held that an ordinance prohibiting the
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to a ban on the advertising of certain products (sugared foods, for exam-
ple) because such a ban is obviously dependent on the content of the ad-
vertisment.129 Advertisers would be permitted to present some
commercials during the regulated times, but not commercials dealing with
sugared products. The FTC's determination of which commercials could
be aired would depend entirely on the subject matter of the advertisement.
The Court's statement in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy that
"[w]hatever may be the proper bounds of time, place, and manner restric-
tions on commercial speech," they were plainly exceeded in that case, 130
implies that the standards for commercial speech regulation may be more
lenient than for noncommercial speech. This interpretation is weakened,
however, by the Court's reference to several of its previous decisions on
such restrictions, 13' a reference that indicates that the Court will use the
standards it has already established in those cases.
Proponents of FTC restrictions on advertising during children's televi-
sion programs may also find support in court decisions indicating that
great weight is to be given three factors involved in these proposals: the
advertisements are conveyed via the electronic media; they are directed
toward children; and the restrictions, in some of the suggested forms, deal
with health. The Supreme Court has long recognized that "[a]lthough
broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment interest
• ..differences in the characteristics of [the] new media justify differences
in the First Amendment standards applied to them."' 32 Further, in Bates
v. State Bar, in the context of an advertising-regulation case, the Court
again stressed that "the special problems of advertising on the electronic
broadcast media will warrant special consideration."' 33 The Court may,
therefore, allow more restrictions over television and radio than in other
areas. One justification for relaxed judicial scrutiny of governmental regu-
lation of the broadcast media was enunciated in Banzhaf v. FCC,134 in
which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted that whereas writ-
ten media requires an affirmative act of reading, "[b]roadcast messages, in
posting of real estate "for sale" signs violated the first amendment. The Court determined
that "serious questions exist as to whether the ordinance 'leave[s] open ample alternative
channels for communication'. . . . Although in theory sellers remain free to employ a
number of different alternatives,. . . [those options] may be less effective media for commu-
nicating the message. . . . The alternatives, then, are far from satisfactory." Id. at 93.
129. To the extent that a ban is aimed at the advertising of certain products rather than
deception, it may also exceed the FTC's statutory authority. See note 30 supra and accom-
panying text.
130. 425 U.S. at 770.
131. Id. The Court refers to several cases on time, place, and manner restrictions, in-
cluding Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), and Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
132. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). "For example, the
ability of new technology to produce sounds more raucous than those of the human voice
justifies restrictions on the sound level, and on the hours and places of use." Id. at 387. See
also Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
133. 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
134. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
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contrast, are 'in the air' . . . . [A]n ordinary habitual television watcher
can avoid these commercials only by frequently leaving the room, chang-
ing the channel, or doing some other such affirmative act."
1 35
In July 1978, in its most recent ruling on profanity, the Supreme Court
wrote, "of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received
the most limited First Amendment protection."1 36 The Court stressed two
reasons for this limitation: "First, the broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans," and "[s]econd,
broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to
read." 137 Both courts and the FTC have traditionally recognized the dif-
ference in comprehension between adults and children.1 38 In the State-
ment of Basis and Purpose for the rule to ban all cigarette advertising from
the electronic media,' 39 for example, the FTC concluded that because chil-
dren are "especially vulnerable and susceptible," a marketing practice di-
rected towards them that "interferes substantially and unjustifiably with
their freedom of buying choice" is an unfair or deceptive trade practice
even if it is not especially pernicious to adults. 4° In that statement the
FTC stressed not only the electronic media's pervasive influence and the
special susceptibility of children, but also the concern for the health..' of
children who buy the products advertised. The FTC stressed in that situa-
tion, as it would certainly stress in supporting the currently proposed rules,
that the restrictions were especially necessary because of the attractiveness
and availability of the product to children, and the inherent dangers to the
child's health.'42
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the legitimate concern with the effect of television advertising on
135. 405 F.2d at 1100.
136. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). The fact that the issue was
profanity is an important distinguishing factor. The Pacfica Court noted that obscene
materials have been denied first amendment protection because their content is offensive to
contemporary standards. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
137. 438 U.S. at 748-49.
138. The "attractive nuisance" doctrine in torts is one example of the courts' long stand-
ing policy of affording children special protection. See, e.g., Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout,
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1874). In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Court
considered the special needs of children in the context of constitutional protection. In up-
holding a statute that prohibited the sale of obscene magazines to minors, the Court noted
that "[t]he world of children is not strictly part of the adult realm of free expression. The
factor of immaturity, and perhaps other considerations, impose different rules." Id. at 638
n.6 (quoting Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
939 (1963)). See also note 104 supra.
139. 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 (1964). See also note 112 supra and accompanying text.
140. 29 Fed. Reg. at 8358.
141. The Wheeler-Lea Amendment, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) to the FTCA included
several provisions that are specifically concerned with false advertising of food and drugs.
See FTCA §§ 12-17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-57 (1976).
142. In Banzhafv. FTC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969), the court stated that "[t]he public health has in effect become a kind of basic law,
both justifying new extensions of old powers and evoking the legitimate concern of govern-
ment wherever its regulatory power otherwise extends."
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children, the FTC may face great difficulty in formulating a rule that ex-
ceeds neither statutory nor constitutional limitations. There are two con-
flicting trends affecting judicial review of FTC action. Traditionally,
courts have allowed the FTC to regulate advertising within its sphere of
authority with very little judicial restraint. The Supreme Court's recent
recognition of first amendment protection for commercial speech, how-
ever, means not only that the agency must concern itself with first amend-
ment considerations, but also that the courts must review agency action in
light of the first amendment. Thus, while the statutory limitation could be
overcome by a broad construction of the FTC's authority to proscribe "un-
fair" advertisements, the constitutional issue is less easily resolved.
The FTC's proposed rules to curtail advertising on children's television
programs, especially of sugared products, are meritorious in many re-
spects. They deal with safeguards for the health of children, and restric-
tions on the electronic media-areas with which the courts have evidenced
great concern and in which federal agencies have been allowed great dis-
cretion. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's recognition of the first amend-
ment protection of commercial speech must impose new limits on the
broad discretion and power of the FTC.
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